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MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By J. Woodford 
Howard. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1968. Pp. x, 
578. $12.50. 
Dramatically and unexpectedly, Frank Murphy learned within 
hours of the death of his predecessor, Justice Pierce Butler, that he 
would be appointed to the Supreme Court of the United States. On 
that day, November 16, 1939, there had been a Cabinet meeting at the 
White House. Desiring to speak privately with President Roosevelt 
about several routine matters, Attorney General Murphy stayed 
behind after most of the other Cabinet members departed. In the 
midst of this discussion with the President, the following episode took 
place, as described in Murphy's own handwritten notes: 
The Assistant Secretary of Commerce was in the room at the 
time. He stood looking out the window at the far end of the Cabinet 
Room. I had drawn a chair-the Secretary of State's chair-near the 
President's right side. He was in his chair at the head of the table. 
In the midst of our chat and when Noble wasn't looking he 
reached over and whispered in my ear "Do you appreciate the signifi-
cance of what happened this morning-Justice Butler's death?" In a 
sense I did but did not want to assume that my name would be con-
sidered so I remained silent. Without a moment's delay he now 
leaned back in his chair and with a handsome grin on his face he 
chucked his arm full length at me, index finger pointing just under 
the head of the table over against my arm and whispered "You, 
you!" I was bewildered not only that he had so briefly come to a 
conclusion on the subject but also, despite the fact that I am fully 
aware of his love of surprises, that he would announce it to me in 
this fashion. "It begins to look like it," he added. 
I quietly said to him, "Mr. President, I am of course at your 
service but expect you to do only what is in the best interest of the 
Country." Beyond this, I said nothing. I did not indicate that I 
hoped it was true, that I was pleased with it or that I would reject it. 
"Think it over for a week and then we will have a visit about it." 
My thoughts were not settled on the subject for I honestly knew 
he could make a better choice for the Supreme Court than myself. 
My long years of training have made me to a degree proficient and 
very fond of administrative work. Reform and modernization of 
government, [and] the selection of discriminating personnel attracted 
me mightily and for these and other reasons I believe I could serve 
the nation better off the Court than on it. Be that as it may a 
Supreme Court Justice was born in the informal and boylike per-
formance recited above. He was in glee throughout the brief episode. 
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He loves with some sort of gleeful passion deflating an important and 
solemn occasion into a normal affair. 
Thus was born a Court appointment that was to span more than 
nine years, an appointment that brought to the Court a man whose 
judicial talents were both unique and controversial. J. Woodford 
Howard, professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, 
has sought in this "political biography" to bring meaning and under-
standing to the judicial career of Frank Murphy. And he has done 
so with the postulate of Jerome Frank in mind: 
The ultimately important influence in the decisions of any judge are 
the most obscure .... They are tied up with intimate experiences 
which no biographer, however sedulous, is likely to ferret out, and 
the emotional significance of which no one but the judge, or a psy-
chologist in the closest contact with him, could comprehend .... 
For in the last push, a judge's decisions are the outcome of his entire 
life history.1 
While not a psychologist and never an acquaintance of Justice 
Murphy, Professor Howard has managed to draw a most perceptive 
and realistic portrait of the Justice. He has come as close as possible, 
at least for an outside observer, to comprehending the emotional 
significance of the events in Murphy's life that influenced his work on 
the Court. This is no hasty tract or superficial biography. It repre-
sents thorough research and mature reflection covering more than a 
decade, starting with the author's doctoral thesis at Princeton under 
Mason.2 And he has had the advantage of examining the recently 
available papers of the Justice, including those of the Court tenure. 
The story of Frank Murphy, as sketched by Professor Howard, "re-
solves itself into an impressive unity ... a life of unwavering defense 
of human rights" (p. 496). As a public prosecutor and criminal court 
judge, as Mayor of Detroit, Governor-General of the Philippines, 
Governor of Michigan, and then as Attorney General of the United 
States, Frank Murphy exhibited an amazing consistency of purpose 
and action in the civil rights arenas. He was an activist in his complete 
and uncompromising dedication to the basic democratic ideals that 
most Americans profess but . so often ignore. And he brought that 
activism, that dedication, to his role as Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court. 
Therein lies the key to the enigma of Frank Murphy-a key that 
serves to explain a great deal about what have been described as his 
strengths and his weaknesses as a Justice. During the 1940's, the period 
of Murphy's service on the bench, the Court was confronted with two 
1. LAW AND THE l\lODERN MIND 114-15 (1930). 
2, Howard, Frank Murphy: A Liberal's Creed (unpublished doctoral thesis in the 
Princeton University Library, Department of Politics, Feb. 1959). 
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major types of civil liberties problems: (1) those generated by wartime 
controls and restrictions; and (2) those emanating from the awakening 
of the legal system to the need for greater constitutional and judicial 
protection of basic human rights. To those tasks, Justice Murphy 
brought a full measure of understanding and insight. In forceful and 
colorful language, he gave voice to the libertarian idealism that under. 
lies the Bill of Rights and that came into greater prominence in the 
subsequent years of the Warren Court. Seldom has the judicial and 
public C<?nscience of the nation been so eloquently expressed than in 
the opinions of Murphy during this period, opinions that for the 
most part were dissenting from or concurring with the results reached 
by the Court majorities.3 
So complete was Murphy's commitment to Christian morality 
and democratic principles that he sometimes appeared to overplay 
his hand, thereby causing much of his conventional work on the Court 
to be overshadowed and little appreciated. As Professor Howard has 
noted, "The essential fact to be grasped about Murphy is that, while 
he was capable of functioning in conventional terms and did so more 
often than not, he chose different tactics when battling for principles 
he felt most deeply" (p. 478). From his earlier experiences in public 
life, Murphy brought to the Court a fighting, evangelical, and emo-
tional approach to civil liberties. It was an approach that sometimes 
translated complex problems to simpler moral terms and allowed 
few procedural niceties to stand in the way of giving vent to vigorous 
constitutional condemnations. 
As a result, Justice Murphy completely antagonized those who 
profess that the legal system is simply a process of calm objective 
discovery of pre-ordained and immutable principles. He appeared to 
some observers to use his seat on the Court as a pulpit from which, 
to use the words of Felix Frankfurter, "'he exercised the compas-
sionate privileges of a priest when in fact he was only a judge' " 
(p. 480). He became known as a "lawless" judge who confused the 
"law" with his own notions of compassion and morality. 
Such denigrating comments, perpetuated and echoed throughout 
the two decades since Murphy's death in 1949, do not find their ulti-
mate refutation in any re-evaluation of Murphy's opinions or in 
a defense of his vanity or the other personal idiosyncrasies that obvi-
ously annoyed some of his fellow men. Rather, that refutation is to 
be found in the growing recognition that the Supreme Court, in 
many of its functions, is necessarily a political institution that is 
3. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 233 (1946): Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945); Steele v. Louisvilie 
&: NashviIIe R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 555 
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 109 (1943). 
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forced to play an activist role in the development of certain constitu-
tional doctrines, whether they be the federalist doctrines of the 
Marshall Court or the reapportionment concepts of the Warren 
Court. The Court is something more than an arbiter of conflicting 
views among lower courts as to the proper interpretation of a tax 
or jurisdictional statute; it is something more than a vehicle for 
resolving legal problems through the use of legal logic or the correla-
tion of past precedents. The Supreme Court is also a unique and 
human institution designed to forge and expand our basic legal and 
constitutional doctrines to meet men's needs. In so acting, the Court 
and its members must perforce reflect and apply, in the context of 
cases and controversies, some of the fundamental notions of public 
and historical morality. 
A natural part of the Court's function in these respects is the 
individual expression of views by the Justices. Confronted from time 
to time with some of the most controversial and significant of our 
nation's social problems, Justices who hold strong views about the 
legal or constitutional implications of those problems have consis-
tently given expression to their views. On occasion those views can 
be contained within the limited bounds of a majority opinion. More 
often, strong views can best and most effectively be set forth in con-
curring and dissenting opinions. Frank Murphy was thus no pariah 
in utilizing such means to voice his abhorrence of what he conceived 
to be invasions of personal freedom. He was not the first nor the last 
to use his seat on the Court as a "pulpit" to preach his notions of 
constitutional freedom. 
History will doubtless judge Frank Murphy not as a lawless 
innovator of personalized views but as a dramatic expositor of con-
stitutional ideals. He had an established right to express those views 
and he will ultimately be judged by the intrinsic merit of what he 
had to say, rather than by the mere fact or manner of expression. 
History will also judge him on the merits of his conventional but 
nonetheless significant contributions to other aspects of the Court's 
role in the judicial system. Such in-depth studies of the man as that 
by Professor Howard make it possible for history to make its judg-
ment dispassionately and with all the relevant facts revealed. 
When President Roosevelt whispered "You, you" in Frank 
Murphy's ear on that day in November of 1939 he was perhaps creat-
ing a judicial figure of greater stature and more enduring qualities 
than either could then foresee. Certainly Justice Murphy's final 
place in judicial history will be more important and significant 
than that assigned to him by those who cry that he misconceived 
his function with that of God. The ultimate truths that time alone 
can establish may well prove that much of what Justice Murphy 
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so eloquently stated in the 1940's had meaning not only for that 
period but for all of our constitutional time. 
Eugene Gressman, 
Member of the Washington, D.C., Bar and 
former clerk to Justice Murphy. 
